| March 12, 2005 Let me share a series of
interviews from David Horowitz' FrontPage Magazine that I
came across by chance from a lead by Google Alerts on monetary
reform.
An
Interview with Dr. Thomas Barnett
Author
of The Pentagon's New Map
| Copyrighted material
reprinted here is for educational non
profit purposes. The views expressed by their
authors here are pertinent to my own views as
expressed on the web for a
decade. They were offered to
me on the internet to read and discuss
and are copied here to
others (adding to their value)it is
fair use of the work. To visit FrontPage Magazine
see www.frontpagemag.com |
Interview
By Jamie Glazov
January 26, 2005
Frontpage
Interviews guest today is Dr. Thomas Barnett,
senior strategic researcher and professor at the U.S.
Naval War College. He served as assistant for strategic
futures in the Defense Department's Office of Force
Transformation (Oct. 2001-June 2003). He is the author of
the new book The Pentagons New Map: War and Peace
in the Twenty-First Century.
FP:
Dr. Barnett, welcome to Frontpage Interview, it is a
pleasure to have you here.
Barnett: Thanks for the opportunity.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Barnett: I was disturbed by the continuing tendency at
the Pentagon to describe the world at large as
"chaotic" and "uncertain," as well as
their tendency to view globalization as a uniformly
negative impact on global security. I don't see the world
this way, and I wanted to share that vision.
The vision appeals
to general readers because of its optimism and its
ability to explain the world in a fairly straightforward
fashion, helping them understand security within a larger
historical context, as well as contextualizing the Global
War on Terrorism within the process of globalization's
progressive unfolding.
It's not that hard
to think about the future systematically. The military
actually does a decent job of it (better than most). It
just prefers to highlight only the negative and to
consistently view war within the context of war alone and
rarely within the context of everything else.
Once you get a
grip on the everything else, war and peace become a lot
more understandable and people's anxiety about the future
can be dramatically reduced. Again, that's why the
general reader likes the book. As for the military, it's
a very controversial book to some, and a real strategy
planning guide to others--especially regional military
commands.
FP: Tell us a bit why you think globalization is, as you say, this
countrys gift to history and why it is crucial for
U.S. and world security.
Barnett: The current form of globalization is really
built on the American model, unlike the first modern
version that we saw from 1870 to roughly 1939, which was
based on European colonialism.
Our model comes
out of the twin crucibles of the Second Industrial
Revolution and the U.S. Civil War, and was a stealthily
rising model in the shadow of European colonialism until
the two world wars destroyed that model and ours became
ascendant.
If you look around the world today, you see our system of
transactions and interdependency becoming the norm for a
good two-thirds of humanity, or what I call the
Functioning Core of globalization.
The trick is to
extend that model of interactions to the rest of the
world, or to make globalization truly global. Why does
that matter? Virtually all the mass violence in the
system today is found within those regions least
connected, in a broadband fashion, to the global economy
and the rule sets that define stability inside the
Functioning Core.
If you want to end
war as we know it, as well as this Global War on
Terrorism, then you connect the disconnected. Bush calls
it "liberty" and "freedom," but I
call it "connectivity." We are, though,
basically talking the same game.
FP: Ok, well then, in the context of what you think about
globalization, you think what the U.S. is doing in Iraq
is a good idea, right?.
Barnett: Transnational terrorism, in the form of the
Salafi Jihadist movement, is fundamentally a function of
globalization. As the global economy penetrates the
traditional societies of the Muslim world, the violent
rejection of the integration is expressed by those
Salafis, like bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, who detest that
process so much they are willing to kill and die to keep
it out, dreaming instead of an Islamic super-state that
would transport people back to the golden religious age
they prefer, a hint of which we saw in Taliban-dominated
Afghanistan.
In short, their strategy is to drive the West out of the
Middle East so they can hijack the Middle East out of
globalization's creeping embrace. We counter that
strategy best over the long haul by seeking to connect
the region to the outside world and allowing that
connectivity to generate local demand from below for
better and more representative government.
Most of this process is driven by private economic
transactions, with foreign direct investment being the
key flow. But
that connectivity won't come if the global business
community thinks the region is a security
sink hole,
full of danger with no one to stand watch over regional
stability. When the U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam, we
set off a Big Bang of tumult and political change in the
region, which is apparent all over the dial but likewise
will take years to unfold.
So long as the big security issues remain in the region,
the Middle East will remain narrowly connected to the
global economy (through energy only), but once those
security problems are eliminated, then I expect broadband economic connectivity will
ensue.
Other than Saddam, two key issues remain in the region:
Israel-Palestine and Iran.
Both are
altered significantly by Saddam's toppling and our
assumption of a key security role in the region--far
more than anything we pursued previously.
The trick now
is to co-opt Iran and with it focus the bulk of our
security effort on Israel and Palestine.
Iraq will be reformed
for now around the Kurds and the Shiites, with the
Sunnis coming back on line as the insurgency becomes
progressively isolated there, also with help from
Iran. That's why Iran is the key now to stability,
and why it's time "Nixon goes to Tehran."
But the underlying
point remains: the U.S. cannot pull out of the Middle
East militarily until the Middle East joins the world
economically and politically--beyond just oil and
terrorism.
If you want to win
a Global War on Terrorism, there is no choice but to
transform the region that is source for virtually all
transnational terrorism--the Middle East. Saddam
was the right place to start, and it was a great war.
The occupation, however, shows how far we need to go in
improving that capacity, because there will be other bad
regimes worth toppling in coming years, so we have to be
able to master the peace, not just the war.
To that end, we need a
military that's preeminent in both realms. We have
the first one down (war), now it's time to get the
second one ready (peace).
FP: So you think the U.S. will annex much of Canada and
Latin America this century?
Barnett: No, I don't, and I think it's awfully strange
you use that word "annex," because I certainly
never do and didn't in the book. Do you think the EU has
"annexed" Eastern Europe? Or do you accept the
notion that states can come together in larger unions
under peaceful conditions?
What I said in the
book was that "The United States will admit new
members to its union in coming decades, and these will
come first from the Western Hemisphere, but over time
from outside as well" (p. 382).
Apparently you read that and could think of only one way
it could occur, which I find very interesting. If one out
of every three voters in the U.S. by 2050 is Hispanic, do
you think it's possible that the United States would be
open to having Latin American states join our union? Can
you imagine a post-Castro Cuban population being desirous
of that opportunity? Or a Haitian? Is the United States a
country worth joining? Or do you think the only possible
means for something like this happening is through
military conquest?
I think your question speaks more to your limited
imagination than some alleged bias of mine toward
military solutions being the only possible pathway for
future integration.
In fact, I put
the prediction in the book for precisely that
purpose: to push the reader beyond such previously
narrowing perspectives. I mean, if the United States
starts at 13 members and now has 50, why would anyone
assume it would remain fixed at that number forever
while the EU is adding states to its multinational
union in bunches? The United States is the world's
oldest and most successful multinational economic and
political union in the world. Americans tend to
forget that, as well as most of our history.
FP: Mr. Barnett, it was just the way I asked the
question, especially since I am thinking of what critics
would ask and I am also thinking of our previous
questions and answers. I cant think of too many
people more pro-American than myself and, as a Canadian,
I think it would be great if Canada joined the States.
And yes, I absolutely do think that peaceful states can
join together without any kind of 'annexation'. And I think
the world would be a much better place if all nations
became Americanized. (To say the least, I was not very
popular in academia because of these views). So I am with
you all the way here. I apologize that perhaps I could
have been clearer in my disposition behind the question.
In any case, Mr. Barnett, your answer crystallized
exactly what I wanted to be crystallized in this
discussion. Thank you.
Last question: tomorrow President Bush
asks you to become an adviser and, supposing you agree,
in the first meeting he asks you what steps he should
take next in the terror war in general and in the Iraq
war in particular. What do you tell him?
Barnett: I would tell him he needs to make sure the
Secretary of Defense pushes the Army to become the
postconflict stabilization and reconstruction force it
needs to be so that when we engage in regime toppling in
this war, we don't end up with the same sort of snafued
occupation that we got in Iraq.
I would also tell
him that setting up an office within State to take on
postwar occupations simply won't work. So long as it is a
tug of war between Defense and State, Defense will always
be looking to pull out ASAP and State will always be
looking to avoid the wars in the first place.
We need a
department between War (Defense) and Peace (State),
one that is focused on getting countries from the Gap
(as I describe those less connected regions) to the
Core. State is built primarily to deal with
functioning states, or the Core, while Defense is
reorienting after 9/11 to wage wars in the Gap.
But the real function of U.S. grand strategy in coming
years won't just be keeping the Core solid and keep the
Gap from growing, it will be about getting countries from
the Gap into the Core.
A department that
focused on that is where we would optimize our ground
forces for small crisis response, postconflict
stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and a host of other operations
"other than war" that the Defense Department is
loathe to perform, much less budget and train for, so we
need to create a bureaucratic center of gravity for such
efforts, which would naturally pull in foreign aid and
the aid programs that are now scattered among 6 different
agencies.
We need to get
strategic on this, and stop treating it as something we
do in between wars. We will never shrink the Gap with
war, because wars prevent bad futures but do not
create good ones. Bush has enough strength now to
start this process, although he is unlikely to finish it.
On foreign policy,
I would tell him what I said recently in Esquire: make
detente with Iran and accept it's getting the bomb.
We need Iran as a
security partner in the Middle East. We also
need to lock-in China now in a strategic security partnership,
while prices are low--so to speak. That will entail us giving up
our defense guarantee to Taiwan, which could easily, in a fit of
peak, pull us and China into a war if we're not careful.
Finally, in his second
term the regime worth toppling sits in Pyongyang.
Over Kim's grave, we should build an East Asian NATO
and shut down the possibility of great power war
there forever.
This is what I
would tell him.
FP: Mr. Barnett, thank you for joining us today. We hope
to see you again soon.
Barnett: Thanks. I always enjoy email interviews like
this.
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